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The a.ssumpthm of conttnl o/ the levers 0//loner by Deng Xiaoping rill (I the inplcrnvuation o/ecommtic
ri'/o na in ('Irma hays vet to plan aut to a logical earl. Despite optimistic and bullish eyahaations of ill(' ii I fit re
proSperh fo China's ccoI I ontit IiIture. there ane nunwloIIN wtcertaiI I ties which should /)('(I NNCNNet I. Tilt, first
aura of concern i's that the reported cstimate.s of economic grox'th are high1v misleading. In light 0/ this
ohsers'ation, the rush to invest in China ma r• he premature a nd nu V involve a speculative bubble which IN
both a cause and an e'//eei of inflows of Western capital. Also, there arc likely to he dimmer prospects /or
profitability of /o1s'n,n investments in China.
Se 'oral Other issues arc also addressed here. Claims /or the .successes of China's gradualist" market
reform also unite scepticism. Additionally, the impact of Confucianism and the continuing role of the Chim'se
burcaucrat t in the alet•eloprmmt of markets is considered. A final and over-riding issue eon.sidcred IN fit(,
romlitiolls /M (1;1(1 ( on5equenc'cs o/ thuJ,xo-ioils pre.csvo-es on China whil! threatens the ltegemonic integrit'
o/ the ruling Party.
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Introduction
There is much excitement about the development pattern evident in China's ''modernisation
progrununes. A chorus of praise points to a widely held acceptance that C'hina's economic growth rates have
exceeded all previous attempts of backward economies to grow out of impoverishment (Overholt. 1993).
I lowever, a few scholars have questioned the reports of China's super-charged growth on various grounds
(Lingle and Wickman, 1994). Aside from the tradition of routine falsification and/or exaggeration of economic
pertmnance of Soviet-style economies, numerous incongruities emerge from an investigation of the economic
dynamics which must he necessary to underpin such high rates of economic growth.
As elsewhere, C'hina's socialist bureaucracy must implement policies to promote a reasonably fair
distribution of the fruits of continued economic growth to ensure political stability. For C'hina's economic
growth to keep pace with its more energetic Asian neighbours, it shall require access to technology and to
massive amounts of foreign capital investment. However. various elements and conditions described belot's
pose a threat to the continued existence of the political entity known as the People's Republic of China. In
all events, foreign investors are likely to find their expectations thwarted by the business realities, the
bureaucratic interferences and their own unrealistic projections for market developments in China. Unless
dramatic improvements are made in these areas, the opportunities offered in other Asian and non-Asian
markets will draw investment capital away from China. In turn, this is likely to reduce the Chinese regime's
ability to use its economic growth record as a means for legitimating its authority.
(*) Senior fellow huropean Studies Programme. National U niversity of Singapore
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C'hina's Economic Growth : Facts, Fantasies and Fraud?
China's real economic grossth is reported to have averaged 8-l2 over the past I5 years. However.
such estimates are questionable due to numerous difficulties in calculating economic growth in ('hina. Perhaps
the most obvious source of scepticism is the possibility of the politicisation of data within China. As with
statistics from other closed countries, there is an historical tendency to conceal economic realities. The vets
high growth figures certainly serve the purpose of the Chinese authorities to claim success in boosting
economic performance. ()%rr-estimates of East European economic output are now painfully evident in the
case of the former German Democratic Republic.' Misleadingly high estimates of C'hina's growth are also
IIke ly to be the result of the monetisation of the economy whereby previously non-reported barter production
is counted in output figures.
Several problems arise out of acceptance of these illusory growth figures. first, it substantial .'ntount
of pension and mutual funds from Western investors is at risk in what might he it speculative hobble. Second.
other alternative investment targets are heing overlooked. for example, East and Central Europe. Third,
these high growth figures are often presumed to he generating a middle class which shall place political
constraints on the Chinese regime. The importance of this last point can he seen in the context of arguments
in support of expansion of('hina's trade privileges, especially GAIT memberslup.
/)irrr,eemcs in Clrmu'.s R1'portecl Growth Fiiur(s
Reports of super-charged economic growth in China should he viewed sceptically, especially due its
vast domain and economically diverse regions. Disparities among the provinces have either arisen or have
been perpetuated due to failures of past economic policies. ('onunon sense alone should raise serious qua scions
about the overly-optimistic growth figures for ('hina. For example. it seems improbable that an enormous
and disparate country should suddenly and for an extended period grow twice as fast as Japan during its high
growth period. Similarly, it is even less likely that Chinese growth significantly outdistances smaller and
much more homogenous in Fast Asia.
Some explanation can be offered for the existence of the puzzling consensus among so mane interested
parties. A trivial explanation might he that nominal rather than real growth figures are reported. Phis is
unlikely. However, snidely reported estimates of 141% real growth for the first halt of 1993 sect made
without reliable data on price changes. Preliminary real growth estimates for 199?-93 have to account fn-
inflation rates of perhaps 20-2591. Such high rates of inflation inuply nei atn'r' real growth lorcertain provinces,
possihly even for China as it whole ()n the basis of such unreliable indicators of both output and inflation,
estimates of real growth should he treated with the utmost caution.
It is likely that the booming and undoubtedly fast-growing maritime provinces have pros ided a
Ptonenkin-like appearance of equally high performance behind the -facade-. Foreigners have long had
ready access to most of the coastal areas, especially Guangdong which is undergoing it draunatic boom. Yet
the economic conditions of the maritime provinces are significantly different hoar most of the rest of the
mainland. The interior provinces do not enjoy the same material gains nor do they have the same access to
modern technologies as do the coastal provinces.
In fact, the interior provinces are variously disadvantaged, both in relative and absolute terms. These
pruhlenrs are Compounded by the fact that an open national market network has not developed in China.
Goods produced in one aura are more likely to he found in foreign markets than in other parts of ('hint. This
is due to problems of transportation infrastructure and the tendency for the output of joint-ventures to he
targeted for export. In any Case, the economic record is substantially different. Despite the grossing importance
of sillage enterprises, most industry is fitund in the maritime region. Inasmuch as industrial growth Nils 0
times faster than in agriculture (Hornik, 1994), it is plausible to assume that the central provinces are falling
further behind the periphery.
lmplirutinn.s 0/ Overrstimate .s nt L onontic Growth
Several problems emerge out of the excessively optimistic growth figures for China. In the first instance.
there is an illusion of the beneficial impact of high gross th upon the development of it middle Class. I'his in
turn has its own implications . On one hand . announcements of world-heating growth rates Create expec tat ions
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about a vast number of eager consumers. Due to the uneven distribution of growth the widely discussed
prospect of 12 billion consumers is a wild exaggeration. It is not likely that the next decade shall see
significant increases in wealth and income beyond the I0-151%r of the population which resides in the coastal
provinces. Absent the formation of national markets and the infrastructure to support them. it could he
longer.
On the other hand, unsubstantiated rumours about high growth and a growing consumer class is drawing
international capital into a potential quagmire or perhaps a speculative bubble. The direct conseyuence, of
this gloomy prospect should he rather clear. The indirect effects are that other investment opportunities
which might provide lower risks with more promising rates of return are being overlooked in the freniy to
develop a business presence in China, e.g. India. Indonesia, East and Central Europe and Latin America.
In all events, there are numerous reasons why estimates of Chinese economic growth should he view ed
with great scepticism. In the end, uneven economic growth in China since 1979 points has lead to heightened
regional tensions. "these tensions and other centrifugal forces combine as a threat to the possible break-up of
this economically disparate country, as shall be discussed helm,.
C'hina's Economic Transition
']'here is ample evidence that the Chinese authorities have little understanding and scant trust in the
outcontes of market processes. In this sense. China's modernisation moves forward in fits and starts.
Ilowever, there are some readily identifiable elements of the transition programme. The outcomes of the
transition process in China as elsewhere Must be understood within an historical context. Due to experience
with extensive state intervention and an obsessive intent to maintain political power in the hands of the
Party, the dead-hand of government remains widely evident. Thus, gradualism as the transition chosen path
is not based upon a theoretical model. Instead gradualist policies were motivated by a tendency to manage
and to control developments. This tendency is also evident in the emerging signs of Chinese macroeconomic
stahilisation policies. These reactions to the contradictions have become more apparent due to the unavoidable
imbalances associated with half-hearted marketisation procedures.
Giaduali.cin or Bi,t, Bmig.*
'['here is an apparent lack of consensus over the best course for economic policy responses during
transition from authoritarian socialism to full-fledged market economy. Most observers find themselves in
one of two opposing camps, often identified as the "acceleration ist '> and "gradualist,, approaches. Supporters
of the accelerationist are guided by a need for rapid institutional changes, i.e. a "short, sharp shock-.
Gradualists promote a step-by-step, piecemeal process. A related issue in the identification of approaches
to economic transition relates to the substantive differences in reform versus transformation. Transformation
is radical and fundamental restructuring whereas reform may merely involve tinkering with established
institutions.
An important observation is often missing in discussion of the intention or effect of transition policies.
It must he recognised that many of the observed economic problems during transition are the hangover
effects of communism. In other words, rather than being the result of a chosen transition path, an unavoidable
systemic chaos arises out of the inherited institutional framework of communism. 'T'hese institutional
frameworks then are the source of observed inefficiencies and irrationalities of the transition process. Disregard
for this aspect of the experience of post-communist regimes can lead to a confusion of symptoms with cures.
As a consequence, interpretation of the progress of actual transition policies may not clearly delineate the
qualitative differences in alternative approaches to systemic change. The "vicious cycle" of under-
development and economic upheaval (shrinking output and rapidly rising prices) arises out of the pre-existing
conditions determined by communist institutions.
Support for the accelerationist strategy arises out of a contmitntent to real and rapid transformation.
Economic as well as political rationale can be summoned in support for the this approach. The economic
effects of rapid and sweeping implementation can convey political payoff.. Bunching refornts at the outset
can involve a sort of "economy of scale" upon the structural incentive adjustments within both the polity and
the economy. In such situations, the unavoidable costs of economic rationalisation can he offset by sonic
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innncdiate benefits. Intplententation of private property as the basis for a rational pricing system and
numetisation of the economy are important initial steps. However, the hidden, non-monetary costs of socialism
(shortages and queues) disappear while the transition costs (rising price and unentployntent) arc associated
with the transition programme. Voters tend to he short-sighted . The sooner the wont of the adjustnteuls arc
experienced. the greater shall be the political payoffs to elected officials. A slow transition path allows the
recollections and disadvantages of queuing, shortages, the poor quality of goods and the lack of imporis to
fade into the distant past. Conversely, rapid implementation can limit the ability for interest groups Ir, toms
in order to obstruct the more painful, yet necessary, changes.
One of the common arguments set forward by gradualists is that the conditioning of socialism leaves
the afflicted populations ill-prepared to confront the chilling conditions of capitalism. A counterpoint to
these claims is that Chinese peasants, despite their complete lack of experience with the market, adjusted
with great alacrity to agricultural reforms. In general, the strategy of' the gradualists is reform-oriented. in
that deep changes in institutions are put off an uncertain future time frame. Piece-nteal rcloti l l obscures the
true source of painful economic distortions. Thus, as suggested before, many observers shall be inclined to
confuse symptoms of the hangover with the prescription for the cure.
Although the theoretical arguments may be inconclusive, the outcomes of observed transition undo mine
the gradualist approach. Beginning with an evaluation by region, the European experience reveals consistent
evidence in support of the accelerationist approach. Estonia and Poland are competing for the highest rates
of economic growth in all of Europe. The Czech Republic, under the capable direction of Vaclav Klaus.
chases the economic growth leaders and has unemployment of 3.5>/r. Hungary is attracting massive amIounts
of foreign capital. Meanwhile, despite suggestions to the contrary. Russia is the archetypical exantple of
gradualism. Mikhail Gorbachev, and most of the so-called parliament which YeItsin inherited, was rigidly
opposed to private property ownership. Latvia and Lithuania and the Ukraine suffer Irons it new chronic
form of <'stagflation" which is common to East European countries which have followed gradualist policies.
In the Asia-Pacific region, New Zealand is the most notable success of accelerated economic transition
policies. It has enjoyed if remarkable recovery from the suffocating effect of socialism imposed by decades
of Labour market policies and economic corporatism. It is also arguable that China's early successes with
agricultural reform were, if not at least it 'mini-Big Bang,,, then it was perhaps it 'big push".
Chinas piecemeal approach is often cited as it successful experiment in gradualist transition police
(Overholt, 1993; Shirk. I993). The presumed superiority of the slow and gradual reform strategy, as developed
in China, has also been promoted in Laos and Vietnam. However. Poland. Hungary and the Czech Republic
are showing rapid benefits from massive sell-offs of state enterprises. These actions have reduced the economic
drag which China faces as loss-making state enterprises continue to require subsidies. I)elays in privatisation
allow inefficient .state-owned firms to absorb tax resources, greatly increasing the unpredictability of the
entire marketisation project, as is increasingly evident in China. In all events. rapid transformation forces
hidden unemployment into the open. Gradualism allows an unsustainable illusion of continued employment.
11111'11 rates of unemployment and sagging production associated with economic transition are actually resi-
dual elements of the failures of socialism. Therefore, the full and sustainable benefits of marketisation
LIepend upon rapid removal of impediments to market processes.
The issue of the universality of China's gradualist approach raises various questions. European transition
began with democratisation. Reformers in China, as in Vietnam and Laos. continue to operate within
authoritarian regimes. Attempts to control an economy are obviously different within it democracy than
under dictatorship or autocracy. Democracies tend to allow citizens to seek out the individual means for
fulfilling their life purposes. If citizens wish to undertake new enterprises, democratic governments try' not
Io crowd out the new entrepreneurs. In order to reach the full benefit,, of marketisation, socialist economies
must implement and enforce private property rights. Provision and protection of such rights shall evennutlly
give rise to it code of personal rights and freedoms. Interim steps require it scaling down of goven^ntent
intervention and abandoning the tendency of socialist states to hoard labor. A reasonably rapid withdnrwal
of the communist state sector is the best hope for China and East Iiurope. Reluctance to reduce state
intervention will Iimit future growth prospects and restrict the emergence of individual rights since the
embryonic private sector is it necessary engine of economic growth. Similarly, restraints upon political
freedom shall retard the development of individualist institutions which are necessary for an entrepreneurial-
driven economy.
Thus, the "successes' of China's gradualist reforms should be viewed as being motivated by an
opportunistic political agenda which has limited long-term growth prospects. However, like other Asian
authoritarian regimes. China is clearly not restrained by democratic impulses. Export-led growth can he
accomplished when prison labour is used to create an artificial competitive advantage. Similarly, trade
unions continue to he suppressed or co-opted in order to restrict rising wages and living standards of their
citizens. These examples provide evidence of the abuses adopted by non-democratic, gradualist reformers.
It would seem unwise to recommend practices of gradualist reform, especially if they can he applied to prop
up morally and politically corrupt regimes which impose economically irrational policies. In all events,
material success is a much-too-limited benchmark for ,success,,. Further, it is also questionable whether
such regimes are capable of generating conditions for long run stability.
In fact, close inspection reveals less impressive gains from China's piecemeal reform agenda. On one
hand, some of the real successes have depended upon the entrepreneurial skills and capital provided from
overseas Chinese. l Iongkong and Taiwan continue to serve as trading partner, financiers and intermediaries.
On the other hand, incomplete reform has obstructed economic advance much more than the reported growth
statistics suggest.
Mm rocrnnnmir Stahili.saNaa Politics
C'hina's record upon recently enacted economic policy provides a strong source of scepticism about the
prospects of gradualist reform to deliver long-terns economic growth. This is most clear in the continued
dependency of the central hank. The dominance of political decisions has contributed to a policy of negative
real interest rates induce an artificially high demand for and inefficient use of investment funds. The erratic
attempts to decide upon and to implement a stabilisation policy reflect the confused programme for reform.
Austerity measures imposed during the Summer of 1993 were abandoned by the Third Plenum of the Will
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to promote "maximum growth,>. More recently
at the 5th National People's Congress, new policies have again been announced as a means to restrain
economic growth. Price controls were announced instead of a commitment to place effective restraints upon
monetary growth rates as a means to arrest inflation.
The inability to control money supply growth arises out of China's crude monetary system which is
guided by political decisions rather than economic rationality or commercial viability. Credit policy driven
by short-term political considerations is likely to be a source of unstable economic growth. Efficient firms
will tend to he prevented from acquiring necessary credits in response to their production plans. Meanwhile.
inefficient state firms are likely to he subsidised, while increasing their inventories of un-marketable goods
and maintaining their stock of underemployed labour.
C'hina's unpredictable macroeconomic stabilisation policies inspire little confidence for future stability.
Price controls on various products were imposed in December 1993, and ambitious plans for expansion of
such controls were announced in March 1994.' This signals either an admission of an inability to control
monetary growth as a source of inflation or an abject ignorance of the historical failure of price controls to
have their desired effect (Schuettinger and Butler, 1979).
Chow's Choirc. Bracacuc racy Against the Markel
The ongoing struggle of productive forces against rule by the Chinese bureaucracy represents an
important contribution to understanding the post - modern world. AS the end of the 20th century draws to a
close, parallels c a n he drawn to movements observed at the end of the 15th century . Now, as then, there is a
global demand for the end of the privilege of the "ruling class,, ( e.g., whites in South Africa, the ('0111111 Lill ist
Party in centrally planned economies as well as assorted despots and autocrats worldwide ). A ,new
enlightenment ,, has arisen whereby state intrusions can he understood to he an important source of human
suffering. In the I 8th century and before, democrats constructed parliaments as a means to limit the actions
of monarchies to confiscate their property and product , especially by restricting the power to tax. Ironically,
this same struggle is presently being fought by citizens against their parliaments and governments which
have evolved into the new and powerful transgressors . In China, this conflict is being played out in a
complex game between independent entrepreneurs , local and provincial government against the communist
regime.
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n.^ml^ lio up~*d th, /uo| nx"a of file mxn.,m `.""m of all inr*xv.|xm,c"on.u betwcell file
uyiu|ia^and tile proletariat. xmvd,m^dx°struggle- invokes a mhng class ^,^vnuuno^and yxn/
xrpxmtcxiuuIto oppose tile productive class "mkxis /ox`y"seJof m/opnoml", and workers. The 111 O LICH)
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nv,ur. The present generation "/Ch"v*m|rI's.,Cents onxm,to recognise that xum"*xri|y
v^'o|u"v^^wu inappropriate mk` provide irresistible imem.`* hvoxnptkw. Rather than niend their
^vuvx/,, tile hun:ocmcyimposes tile ultimate /^nn"(^n,Vvoo"n^"o/mn/y/Oft d:|^, uumi^u. m,
nxx:xm^u S4ou, iocikvt wm oo|/ die xru m"wJ in We ^uU, agaio,l the xo/hvot} of' /x, (hixr*
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U, m/h its principal kcu^xgxin* unrepentant cupia|i`wand .xd,p,odux'm.od*/;.w,mmum om.ix|^ ix
tile plovinces.
The ^1 gin' F urx'urd.'
In support ^^^ Chinas approach to reform, it has been argued that authoritarian regime, are well placed
to tinge through unpopular measures which are necessary to nrirketise an erunomx. "Those who support This
point of view find the political costs of continued repression to he accepuiMe. Ironiadl^. This claim deflects
arguments against the implementation of rapid economic transition. If political costs can hr readily ignored.
the more rapid the transition process, then the economy can move more rapidly onto a higher growth path.
While erratic implementation of suihilisation may itself be destabilising to Ihr economy, the ^urrrnt
mix of policy is likewise coonter-productive. One of [he principal concern. of the communist regime is ^u
nriintain employment levels in order to forestall unrest. I luwever, the continued pmscnce of negaticr rr;il
interest rates and nuxuuing bud^^et deficits is both symptomatic and causal in the impending unemployment
crisis.
Neg^uive real interest rates reduce the cost of capital relative Iu lahour, inducing producers w shill
toward capital-intemivr processes. "hhis can only lead to disisu^ous results in :m economy which has a v;nt
lahour surplus. Refusal Io raise interest rotes is related to the groN^ing budget deficits. While tas revenues to
the centre have been uihstantiall^ reduced, there has been little ,acres, in reducing expenditures. tiuhsidirs
^u st:ue enterprises hove become one of the nwst significant soarers of drag un the Chinese ecunom^. First.
nut allowing ^hr firms w go hankrupi Hiram that they will divert tax expenditures from other government
prugranunes and hid away resuurrrs from more productive economic activities. Second, the amlinued
dominance of s^alr enterprises odds rigidities [o the lahour market.
^hhc remedies arc simple, if nut easy to implemem. Interest rates must hr olluwcd to rise, in order ^o
encourage nun^r ra^iunal use of capitol and greater intensity in the use of lahour. If accomplished Ihnnigh
tighter nxmrtan policy to rein in mums' wpply growth rates, this should also restrain inflation S^atr
enterprises nw,t he allowed ro gu bankrupt or to be restnic^ured through privatisation. ^^ sound and just
rununrrcial rode must araimpuny complete transformation of exchange ra^r policies to pn>vidr greater
confidence to tiirrign investors. In the end, the Chinese regime shall have to abandon the dominance u(
political expediency over market-related policy in order to achieve the economic growth rates nerr•aury to
absorb the annual entry of 50 million or so into the labour tiircr.
('onfucian Culhirc, Individuals and Indi^^idualism
|x~°,om/,`r|"n.the impad of C^um'ixxmxvnupon patterns "/and r^1e/t^^vr/mwx`u
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exhibit pursue goals which are ostensibly comntunitarian , there is an attempt to prunutte the role of the
individual as an entrepreneur . An unstable equilibrium should he expected to emerge since entrepreneurs
are conspicuously individualistic, contrarian and generally defiant of established orders.
Li ononur l)rrclopnient in Confucian Lai Asia
I conontie performance in China and selected other economies in Fast Asia is often said to embody one
of the great economic success stories of history ( World Bank , 1993: Chowdhuri and Islam . I993). Of these
major new global players, Ilongkong ( Under British colonial rule until 1997 ) and the countries of Korea.
Singapore and Taiwan are linked historically and culturally through Confucianism . " Phis entrenched value
system has had an important impact upon the development of institutions in this region which in turn influence
current economic performance . Following this line of reasoning , some projections are Offered on the future
institutional Change within this cultural setting.
The process of economic and social advancement in Confucianist Cultures is constrained by the paradox
described above. () n one hand , governments have sought to legitimate their exercise of a degree of authoritarian
power ( often coincidental with a substantial degree of social harmony ) by appealing to Confucian tenets of
respect for authority and adherence to long-standing traditions .' In this context . the individual is expected to
put society above self. Individual interests are to be subordinated to the interests of the Community (or at
least those identified by the ruling political party ). On the other hand, these saute governments also recognise
that their legitimacy depends upon « performance » criteria, especially in terms of economic progress. The
links hetween the delivery of economic performance as a means for community advancement is well
understood to depend upon entrepreneurial actions within open and competitive markets.
In this context , individual action in pursuit of individually-Chosen , subjective goals will often appear to
he in conflict or to be distinct front others in the community . Contrary to the Confucian precepts .-
real-entrepreneurs seek their own identity and tend to view their actions as serving their own ends rather than to
serve as a means for others in the Community . Logic suggests that these inherent contradictions constitute an
unstable equilibrium which requires constant attention and an unerring, steady set of hands .' Otherwise
these incongruous forces become in open conflict with some of the other aims of governments in a C'onfucian
Context , including a threat to their Continuity . Like other activities which require micro-managing and Continual
fine-tuning, maintenance of this balance is likely to be very difficult , if not impossible.
What follows is an investigation of the arrangements and outcomes of institutional structures within
communities with historical and/or political links to Confucianism . In order to trace out a scenario for the
future resolution of the paradox described above. First, it shall he necessary to cone to an understanding of
the Characteristics and actions of entrepreneurs . Further, a complete understanding the entrepreneur in a
Confucian Or any other culture requires an examination of the role and concept of the individual and
individualism in that culture.
«Real,, Lntczluenrar.c as Agents n/ Change
A variety of definitions can he found to identify entrepreneurs in terms of a variety of characteristics
including risk-taking behaviour, innovation, ownership, profit-making ortaking or control of resources ( I lehert
and Link, 1955: Sexton and Kasarda, 1992). Of three general categories, the first focuses upon the tendency
to start-up and manage new businesses. A second interpretation points to growth and pursuit of opportunity
(Sexton and Bowman-Upton, I991 ). A third definition is seen to he more complete and exclusive. It focuses
upon innovation (Kiru.ner. 1973) whereby entrepreneurial actions result in new arrangements of resources
which improve upon and replace existing arrangements.
The first two definitions allow for an interpretation of entrepreneurship which is too wide and on their
own do not reveal the essential qualities of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurship does not necessarily involve
success not growth. Indeed, entrepreneurs do fail and this possibility of failure is what characterises the
activities of true entrepreneurs. Thus, while innovation is a defining quality, risk taking is also a necessary
feature Individuals whose access to markets is protected or provided by government edict do not satisfy the
criteria associated with entrepreneurship.
"Thus. it is necessary to draw a distinction between real and mythical entrepreneurs. Real entrepreneurs
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am risk taking innos: tors scho operate ss ithin the market ss ithuut eosernntental assistance. I heir Iortuncs
depend upon their own initiatives and ability to circumvent restrictive rules. Mythical entrepreneurs operate
with the complicity of governments or political parties. Their fortunes are dependent upon their loyalty to a
particular political order or adherence to it set of rules. Identification of a real entrepreneur should not
depend upon the degree of (material) economic success. This nay he misleading, especially in the case of
special access or limits upon competition provided by governments to Ibuy^l political loyalty. The wtural
condition of real entrepreneurs is to upset the status quo. These habits in the market place max he easily
transferred to the politic al realm. Those entrepreneurs who are able to make their fortunes ss ithout government
assistance are not likely to feel beholding to any political order. In fact, clue to the tendency for governnienis
to intervene and to restrict contract arrangements between private parties, real entrepreneurs may lend to
have a disparaging attitude towards governmental authority.
I'niyur Business Arr1111 genu'ut .c in China
In order to protect or to promote the status quo, it is not unlikely than many ,entrepreneurs - are carefuIly
selected individual , perhaps cronies of the ruling party, to" hom special treatment often mutual adstntage.
Instead of self-selection through possession of special skills, many, it not most of the observed cull epteneurs
are likely to be those with the best connections or relations with the ruling parties . Thus , it may he to the
benefit of governments to establish it myth around entrepreneurial action which is operational I) little more
than special access to economic markets.
Numerous problems for investors arise in any country undergoing such dramatic transition towards
ntarketisation of its economy as is China and Fast-Central Europe. One of the most significant considerations
is the primitive development of the treatment of business enterprises with the legal system . Most of the lases
cover statutes which relate to criminal or political matters. There are few independent lawyers to assist with
legal interpretation or litigation . , Guanyi , private connections , continue to he the mist important determinant
of the outcome of administrative rulings . In turn, administrative rulings are the most decisive component of
conflict resolution . Thus, those with personal or family contacts are able to secure special advantages.
I lowever , it is too often overlooked that guanxi is it iero-sum game, i.e. access by one individual is offset by
lack of access to another. A dynamic system depends upon positive - sum games in order to allow growth.
The enormous and uncontrolled capital flight out of the country is only one indication of the problematic
black market operations in China. The central government has lost control of the growth process and black
market speculation. corruption . capital flight , deteriorating living standards for it substantial proportion of
the peasant population are characteristic of'conditions in China . Absent of government hacking. the suppressed
Chinese "business class " builds up and conceals its wealth in the black markets , outside the grasping purview
of central government and provincial tax collectors.
Fconomic Freedom and Demands for Political Liberty
Discussions of the link between Chinese economic growth and post-reform economic and political
freedoms begin on uncertain ground. One of the most problematic aspects of this issue arises out of the
piesiinied linkage in the operational notion of -property rights), in China. This issue is ofexirenie importance,
since many observers expect that the current embodiment of property rights can support the rise of enihryonic
Chinese middle class. Most observers expect that it bourgeoisie shall muster the economic strength and
political will to demand greater freedoms.
I lowever, the absence of full resale rights for landed property limits the emergence of it middle class by
retarding formation of property markets. Those "markets" as they might he seen to exist involve ectrenie
restrictions placed upon participants in these transactions. Full scale markets operate on the basis of it
process of hid-and-otter. I lowever, property prices in urban areas are unilaterally set by the government and
negotiations are non-existent. Similarly, property rights for peasant are tentative. Under post-Mao market
reform, access to agricultural land consists of non-transferable leaseholds.
Apart front property ownership, another important precondition for the growth of it full-scale middle
class is to allow greater private control over capital. It is unlikely that it vibrant and politically independent
middle class with business-oriented interests shall emerge when severe limits are placed upon their autnxnny
136
in pruduriion decisions . At the numient, Chinese law obstruc t s economic independence through rxtensicr
hureaurraiic control of most resource and financial nuu^kets. It is unlikely that there shall be a wholesale
removal of These consuls by Chinese authorities . Such a retreat would pose a threat to the permanence
of the political hierarchy . since maintenance of such rules provides an impunani s^wrcr of power.
Given the current levels of corruption , this power seems to be exercised often fur the personal
enrichment of Party cadres.
As a conseyuenre of extensive bureaucratic controls over various sectors of the economy. numv
of the members of the observed middle class seem to he in a dependenr^^ rrlatiunship v`ith the
Cunununist Party. Apparently, [beer are nu long-term plans to encourage the growth ut a broader.
nurre indrprndrnt middle class . In a recent interview. Vice-Premier ""/.hu Rungji declared that while
Ihr economies of the West would be based upon private ownership , the Chinese economy would hr
based un socialist ownership . In fact , one definition of China ' s hybrid. «market socialism» is a m;ukrt
economy without capitalists. Given the influences of Confucianism and the continued , explicit
runslruinis upon enh^eprrneurs, there is little hope for a rapid development of a vibrant middle class.
While they may become wealthier , Chinese ci^iirns are unlikely to develop the will ur the ability to
farce democracy upon a reluctant socialist bureaucracy in the near future.
The Future for a (' entralised ('hina
fu sug^^est such a auaclysmic event as the breaking up of China (PRC) is undouMedly a runtenliuus
issue. I luwevrr, the only way to prepare t^>r or to prevem events of such imponderable runscyurnre is to
dare to pander them.
Such musings should nut be dismissed on Ihr suggestion ut^ a hidden agenda bused upon su:urgir
concerns. Certainly the destabilisation of China might he seen in some quarters us a desirable means to
weaken its ^rrrituriul claims in [he region. lrithcr should it he suggested [ha[ if an imagined Mrak-up could
have occurred then it nvm/rl have occurred when «morale was at its lowest point atter'I^i:uruunen». It is nut
^ Tear whose morale was law aftrr'I'iananmrn Massacre. Certainly the CCP leadership was firml^^ in control.
and there weer very few signals of dissent within the FLA. it seems clear that the Chinese peasantry. the east
nnijurity of Ihr population, were either unaware of or unaffected by the slaughter of Their fellow ritiirns in
lirijing. Without involvement of the peasantry. [here would he little fundamental change in the Middle
liin^^dum.
Nur is i^ adequate to suppose that [he dominance of Han Chineu, canstituting as they du ^)(1` i of Ihr
population, shall serve as an adequate guarantee against abreak-up of China. Racial ur n^ihal hunuigrnrity
has seldom been rnou^^h to eliminate internal suite. Civil wars are fought among people of ^hr same racial
ch;uacirristirs. Separatist violence in countries occurs among people of the same race. Though often of
diflcrrn^ ethnic ur cultural ha^k^^ruunds. Similarly, assertions of the hr^^emunic tendencies of shatrd racial
rharaclrristics ignore C'hina's awn recent snuggles of the communists against the KM^I^.
In t^^rt there are dramatic si^^ns of a weakening of the grip of the central authorities v`^hirh si^znal Ihr
nrcruary Ihut not sutiirientl weakening of central control which might lead to un h1'puthesised break up of
Chino. ^I^herr have born rrpur^s of a widespread increase in one of the most pernicious problems ^u have
plugual per-Lihrr:uion China, «warlord» activities. Combined with the re-emergence of warlords is the
abuse of pu^^rr h^^ municipal and provincial ul^ficials. A ready explanaiiun for these evens ran hr linuul in
Iwo cirrums^ancrs. First, the uneven development of regions which has been prunu^ied by inrfficirm economic
policies associated with CCP rule. Second, related to the above is the destabilising ettrct of inflation which
is ruinridental v,^ith current rrliirm.
h^^^iun^il l)i.cpuriN^^s ^u^d l)c^^Y^ihili.euhn^
rumm| ,|p"uing xm|,`uu iv,+uc .nwmrwivn io,uxmn`c and social xn"iu, xx,,/vxm^o/,o
m.gu.|/ *vo,,,x nximu| economic u,v^|vpmux withinc»ina. nu, \,\c shall reverse the Bman's and
|'mo^`^um^m,,,|`rmuxm/^i^^wxiCxPointed to .nrm'xm/o,tile r"ucipx|oo^,vro*Cuk,r|.`pm,m
.o Tmn| vvm/o oouoma, It 'mn he ,,p|"o With ^'nm Suc'ra x,n to np|xio the uxun "rxvtxmi/x,.^u
SOCIAISIll to ill'sUre halanccd economic growth in China. In all events, an explanation must be IOUIRI 10
1^7
u|`Lt otile mm.^m,"^r;"ro!u`Jthe higm>uneven .xvnmo.wof mxmm^.m,|'9mm/"xmo.,
owmr. * xm*;4 committed to socialism. Time I,, no need to challenge 111C entire 0^ 11)LIN Of Flank", of
xxnm^^ww«. n.wrul, m°vof tile historical ioUou^,^o,vvhed in then- mmk|toe `,|^.o|uIll Aox,iuo
omCmrnmpxu`t 1111,1011 he interpreted to relate to mercantilist (i.e.. noll-private and dominated) policies
oInch ,ndx*|oyiu|.u, private initiative,,. |odr,U, arguments that o'.uxxop"viaa^omkICm
yv'omdiovw`lot the x.v^ho|imp^,ui`hmu`t of' Latin America im.ght he seen 10 he as tenuous it, Would he
all :ssrxiow o/u /x, k.n,^ of capitalism xor (|u cause ^fth, mnxxt problems ,xome^e,,k1m`m/ in
China.
It Call be x,wathat central planning m^ ^"ci,x^t n',"mrm^^U'm^nuo. m°xuio*J, xuUd,,y,oro
economic m^kmr,'|"p`emill various n;.vo^of China. As in wo,,~*ixxxeconomies, °N,mvof file
loss and m~xypx.p.xhm'of w"nvx`ir^o,,|o`is dmd)seen to xx,,mmn,dduring the gmxomy,mxmu
of Chinese °v.xx^t omr|.vw`uni. xmi»xt he xTmdMW We ^vooJ,x^m^of uneven uork1mvxt uvx
out of file ,n,u^ .,r,ig.o nm*| ,ux*o* a n d "io+|mnimko cmu'utuo"x ur*x iw/v'stnx| m[uo^i"o.
iik,vi*, fh, rigidities ^°"cim*] vith the m^o^p^ixk mmn "r°xW.^m, omkwN*!|/ '"om^"/,o *
C»io^'^regional p^u,imtkwvithixChina. lxi,polah^mim` i. u/uv"^uV|> tile ^""x,Of vx,mx"mgx|
^vx,^"hichtill utex/lie x,»on^nic 'vh, ion of tile [rT |x/,n^ iv^nmx^xn*^o^",xpp|^i*:/x,logic
uu,*mmo|uJOf |`xx[^mwk|mum|y,c^xrcw`xqouvc w~cix|i*xno/u,txxxopiuxvn. *ou^m
v, i^that [lie ^uvx^Ww.owof txr*ymp.at."nmxpymy^ukwof th*«m^vxic surplusot tile satellite
onJm.mx|`m'*,hy tile modern, "uou,fill sector" vtile Chinese `zmmm/n^xo*|in it uvoixvvo"m,
"/m^cxk,,|.qx'^nt of tile mx| ycx« uv, m rec e nt cxx/l,121* iu v^mwoi' po|^` .x Caw, all ^ypxnxI
Consensus x"wx/kovwled;r^file persistenc e Of tile Underdevelopment gemuxxqu/y qvmui/g u`x/*Wim'ws
of central platilling'.
(hixx".peasants wurp,,hoy^file most ,`p|Oiud,kxim^Of °,ix|iu'iufindpolicies. Th,!^oUrnd
nvo` lox iorvo, Jvr to Jrpn^*V ,;,imxom| pnvou Price, and had little aCCCS, to tile social amenities
xn.b»le to vm:xwwtux. The hnvdohxx,mx|Jispxot^ iorxmin.g,, iu*xn,s, and /nvxumT,^|"rof
^vtpxt xx^heeo xggm`:t*]v,oom,wm|r pev^xm^' no| .umx,^either mx;um of tell. xxzmf np,n
'ilCd that income ^vvmxxresidents xu^27/iou,1-InxtC,/hamrural residents (Il^mik, 1994). (a|lex".^t
p`Udm have not *xu ^uNdcn/ mc^n,c/ vxJ,x|odvpmux "`China and mu\ x:,,,,o^iu|! ,xilc,dnn*J
ng"x^|ixumuoi^p^io*. ^vi:|iwpv|ww^*^n^Vdr^.mympul^/o^umu*^`prxngiwu|o"~.m*
lo,* hi^*oo| yn^^u*.uxnulICd vxx (lie stresses associated vi/hr,vu^n.c /m^ iooo thleatcli tile
Continuation Of CCIIIra1i1,CCI rule ill China.
lei%lutkui un^l Urrlrn^^ of Cr^tnz^/ AuNu^rih^
Political leaders fit (Tina upn` Wc^mx,t -Ca l and kwmo*of inflation *do their o*uevnn.in
/;em`xx^m^ ovtile mmrn:«v`. n>po`.xnu.^xis *~u.u*|".mthe r,mmu|collapse of the KM 's
control met the mainland 'oux^`, 1967: w'6|`. Added to till,, dlead I,, that the effect,, of uncompensated
Inflation are credited lot tile rise of tile so-called J*n^cnc\ nwmouol.^
The Spec t re Of Inflation um,.om^ m hmom t»c rmx,^c lemeohi,:, /lle^ ancrilpt to reconcile file
'wxuoiuivxs xn^.xu out of, the comvm" mvouxismi"x process. |.Cw`moic umm` front it Count) till i'a.
^ntlax^-plxmleo xur nmx^ in .mr./a^|, no.vn»v^"x, ^mx ill n|u.vr xxox^wm/, `,m`". |^~reox
he om|t x^x ix vnn| xx/~ '111C/ Call mII, he xwoom vu/ *omtev rwmnx^. In tx, |xtx/ow% mi.
""wu.o."/`r.mr"°mmwot mu.le.
'Ile ovmnLase i.mmxim,noix*as it ix`"|,es co-opting xrvu`^x|mo^x"rr"m.o|"n"`^i^m'
m^,vpx /mx,'ow",x. /xv "{'x, m.~/ °n~o,r ~mo, "/rw,m/u| iostuwlm Is tile \a"I amount of
',,°wu,| vI"h o,r,xo^upon con On ma u*, ^c nmn /x,mxm| I t om.un*n .x,nc.unI vx/,
wouxtcn"iv^. In xg,mof tile uv^.xx*/,*mi'.xx."uof m^m| mxuxurm,^',^^vxixwa`u^~*^`*
ov`rky^'m"ming slate nno"v.xContinue *^muxvtC w.xn*i"w,rpv°wu^ lkk"m.m^of n"x,.,
^I^',mCl-pn°`mxn[till nnxuine|.*^m, mxnin nxuu.udifficulties. Total losses lot |vvlimxoxa,^
."*2,/ uu,xcr*|rs`.,5 wx.wm"mik, 1994L Ile xckmx`IMgmu^'umuh uu"..xeiomoi"xin Ile
^,v m"xm^ of 1994 oxnnn` that p,xoo| tensions nxu.o it .igxinoxm Source of ullrexoked conflict.
*xu i^xppxnxu .^: ~v ^rixn^owmr, /p|, Mere cxn/ stages of iuUmivw m,, nx"xn, muu /,uo it
I^H
Ihr recent retreat u( Chinese authorities ti^um austerit }^ may retleci an arcept:uue ^^( realil^ h^ Ihr
central hurrwcrac^ . " Ihr rrntral guvernmrnt continues to be weakened relative to the hi^^h - gro^^th ^^r^^^^inre,.
"I'hr rxu^emely uneven economic grrn^th pattern, in China rural dreisivc ronn^adirtions . " l^hese arc further
complicated by inflation ^arncrate^i by the high-gmwih maritime region ^•hirh imposes unromE^ensaicel ^^rirr
rises upon the Icss developal provinces . /^Uempts by central authorities to inu^uducc redislrihuiive politics
to aid ihr relatively poor and depressed majorit^^ is likely to face stuhborn resistance by the more pmsperuus
minun^y of the coastal provinces . Control over tax rexxures is a continuing source of friction which weakens
the C('P :uxl threatens the survival of centralised political control.
lissrntially, inflation is hoth a cause ant an effect ofthe ermion ut the puv,rr of the cenu^al hure:wrracv.
^hhr proportions of total tax revenues collected by central authorities continues to shrink rrlaticr to the fuel.
captured by provincial auihuri[ies. Raluccd io a « dependency > status. the ccnu^al government continues to
lost influence over provincial affairs . Unless the shortt^all in taxes is halancal by reductions in expenditures.
budget drficib will heein to rise. The initial response to this groNing gap a<^s to finance ii thruuch inilatiunar^
injertiuns of nctil^ printed money.
Conclusion
1hus Oww is ample eviclowe 151 powet- has thl-dial out of the haMs of Ww's cciaml mwbh,,(
I)UfCaLICILIC^. FUI'thCI- indiCation of this is that corl-UptiOn, C\eIl allion'-, Ilqu'll lexcl pam cadics, Is reaching
epulcillic plolloltioll', In tact, 101; of all clinlinal cases helld In Chilla imoked Parl\ ol.
officials (I lorink. 1994). Sll'U^',^',ICS Continue OVC1 atlenil)(,, b^ the central gmernment to raise its ta\ hase
NA hiC I I CO n HiCt, ^^ it h 111OVillCia I aLlIthOl'itICs ^A IIOJCA0111,1^ guard then o\k it I e\ C [ILI CS. IIIII)OIi I i Oil Of atiStel'it ^
plan', bit', been spasmodic as [11C^ illll)illl-'C Upon pm"Kial gm"th tagets especiNV in We nmi-inme wgion.
China", 10111-1 Inal-Ch 10\A'dI-d ^kidcl^-shaled prospclit^ SeClus likel^ to I-CsUlt ill it dilICIC1111 110111ICal
al-chifCcull-C. A federal option ora total hicak-upare but t\VO possibilities. Regional fies ha^c been strengthened
due to increased economic ccu"viyence as mell as historical md ohnic honds. III this sense, Taman hit,,
longed the simic sort of link,, \Aith 1)1'0\'illCeSOf sOIIthCIn China it,, has llongkong,. AsclseMiere ill the \wlld,
these legional loices shall sliain (lie labric ofthe nation-state.
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Wide of the content of this paper his been influenced and improve by insights from my inestimable colleague and
Iriend, I)r Kurt WICKMAN. I alone hear responsihilits for env defects in the manuscript. The author also acknossleges
financial assistance from the Institul d'kstudis Catalans and CIRIT Nhich enabled the paper to he presented before the
Societat ('atahura cl'Pconomia.
'.'hhe cerlaints of hindsight requires total dismissal of estimates which portrayed Soviet per capita income to he near that
of Spain in the 1950'x.
'. Price increases have been limited on at least '_0 widely used commodities and scryices. "I hose ceilings include mans of
the staple loods in Chita, energy sources, public transport and fees for schools and hospitals.
The cure Confucianist values include discipline, keeping peace sloth neighbours, society above sell, reverence for
scholarship. as Nell as loyalty and respect I or aulhorits. This latter injunction involves it variety of hierarchical relationships,
including between generations (Idfit l piety) and between ruler and the ruled (loyalty to the state).
)l course it is possible to resolve this paradox by suggesting that ruling parties simply attempt to hind Eastern values
into it national ideology which the' in Will direct for their own purposes. In this setting. real entrepreneurs are replaced by
those who are close to the governnielit officials.
. It is widcly believed that file popular protest which led to the Tiananmen massacre sya, it response to inflationary
pressures. More important, the price increases resulted in it general real decline in standard of living for the bulk of the
population on fixed incomes. Students were especially affected since they have no real output Nhich they could use in
barter trade to offset rising prices.
One aspect of the political economy of reform appears to he the introduction of it ,reonu cycle". Attempts to micro
manage reform is likely to have the same outcomes oh micro-managed economic stabilisation policies. Whereas "political
business evcles' are observed in Western democratic industrialised economies, reform can he expected to generate similar
distortions and uncertainties which have their own responses. In both instances, we observe "policy-induced'' business
cycles.
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